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Summary findings
Debate on Indonesia's palm oil policy was stimulated by  The structure of the tax discourages local processing
a sharp increase in cooking oil prices in 1994-95  and a  by squeezing margins for processing. And determining
resulting increase in the export tax rate on crude palm  tax rates on palm oil products independent from the
oil. Palm oil has been one of the fastest growing  underlying crude palm oil price creates uncertainty about
subsectors in Indonesia. In two decades, annual output  marketing margins for processors, inhibiting effective
grew from less than 400,000  tons to more than 4  risk management.
million. Using a quantitative model, Larson analyzes the  Larson recommends repealing the tax. He also
effect of government policies, including the export tax,  recommends discontinuing buffer stock operations and
buffer stock operations by the BULOG (the national  directed sales from public estates because they are
logistics agency), and directed sales from public estates.  ineffective at lowering domestic prices and affect
Larson acknowledges the export tax's effectiveness in  investment by creating needless uncertainty.
lowering domestic prices, but observes that its impact on  Larson concludes with recommendations on
inflation and consumer welfare is minimal. Cooking oil  investment policy. Direct incentives (in the form of
accounts for only 1.4 percent of the consumer price  subsidized loans) to private investors have been an
index and welfare gains to consumers are small (less than  indirect instrument for overcoming investment risks and
$1 per capita annually) because the importance of  uncertainties, but investors should no longer need those
cooking oil has declined in the household budget of even  incentives.
the poorest  households. (It is 4 percent of the household  Instead, Indonesia's government should focus more on
budget of the poorest  20 percent of the rural  alleviating obstacles to private investment, such as lack of
population.)  rural infrastructure,  land titles, and sovereign risk. The
The tax has also had the unintended  effect of  Bank might be of assistance in this area.
transferring income (up to US$99 million a year) from
oil palm growers - 22 percent of them smallholders -
located primarily off Java.
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Summary
During the last twenty years, the history of the palm oil industry in Indonesia is one
of evolution from government sponsorship and market interventions to private sector
initiative in response to international price signals. The evolution of the market from public
to private sector, while substantial, is incomplete.  Investments in new oil palm estates
receive preferential financing terms. Further, marketing interventions aimed at reducing
inflation and assisting consumers remain but with unintended consequences.
Production of palm oil  in Indonesia has increased dramatically, from less than
400,000 tons in 1975 to more than 4.4 million tons in 1995. Until 1992, most palm oil
was produced on publicly-owned estates, although the mix will change rapidly during the
next decade as existing plants mature.
Indonesia is one of the lowest-cost producers of vegetable oil in the world.
Comparative studies on production costs, based on engineering techniques, generally
estimate average costs at around $200/ton. However, a recent study on the field costs at
nine Socfindo estates puts the cost of production -- including depreciation of capital
investments -- at $127/ton. With palm oil prices currently above $600 tons and projected
to remain above $400 for the foreseeable future, prospects for new investments are bright.
Since 1991, the government has intervened infrequently in the marketing of palm
oil. However, with the price boom in palm oil, inflation fears and concern for consumers
has motivated recent market interventions. Still, growth in incomes over the past decade
has resulted in a diversified household budget with less importance given to cooking oil--
even among the poor.  Cooking oil comprises 1.4 percent of the CPI and 4 percent of the
household budget of the poorest 20 percent of the rural population.  As a result, the 21
percent increase in the prices of cooking oil in 1994 only contributed 0.3 points to the
inflation rate.  Further, the costs to the poorest consumers of the increase in palm oil wasequivalent to a 0.4 percent decrease in their household income.  It is unlikely, with average
incomes growing at more than 6 percent, that the price increase created a burden for most
consumers.
The government currently uses three policy tools to affect domestic prices: 1) an
export tax; 2) buffer stock operations; and 3) directed sales from public estates. The
export tax is triggered when FOB prices reach $435/ton and  targets only above-average
profits. The tax has been effective in lowering domestic prices, but does so by transferring
income from the oil palm growers who are primarily off-Java, to the government and to
consumers who are primarily on-Java.  Analysis suggests that the welfare gains to
consumers are small -- less than one dollar per capita per year. Further, twenty-two
percent of the growers are smallholders.  As a result, the tax runs counter to the
government's development priorities.  Since the advantages to consumers are limited, the
government should repeal the tax.
The way in which the tax is implemented creates a burden for the processing
industry. Generally, the tax has discouraged local processing by heavily taxing processing
margins. Further, since the tax rates for palm oil products are not directly linked to the
tax on crude palm oil, processing margins are unpredictable and the policy inhibits
common risk management practices such as forward sales. This is an unintended
consequence of the mechanics of the tax. If the tax is not repealed, it should be modified
to address this short-coming by basing the tax on palm oil products on their crude oil
content.
Since the reforms, restrictions on imports and exports have been lifted and
domestic prices of crude palm oil and refined products, including cooking oil, have
followed international prices. As a result, crude oil and olein stock pile operations and
directed domestic sales cannot have a substantial enduring effect on domestic prices.
These interventions transfer income but do not accomplish the intended purpose of the
interventions-- improving the welfare of consumers.  Further, the interventions create
needless uncertainty in the investment community. Regardless of the government's
decision regarding its policy of lowering domestic prices during boom periods, these
interventions should be abandoned.
2Although profitable, investing in plantation crops is a risky business characterized
by a number of substantial hurdles.  The Government of Indonesia has successfully
encouraged new investments by investing directly through public plantations and by
offering loans at below-market rates of interest.  Because of improved domestic capital
markets and interest by foreign investors, the industry may no longer require direct
incentives. Rather, the GOI might consider addressing the obstacles to private investment
directly. The World Bank could play a role as well, by developing programs jointly with
the GOI to address 1) rural infrastructure needs; 2) land titlement; and 3) issues of policy
risk.
1.  Overview
As incomes have grown and levels of human and physical capital have accumulated
in Indonesia, the economy has become increasingly  diversified. Agriculture provides an
increasingly smaller portion of national income, declining from 56 percent of GDP in 1965
to 19 percent in 1993. This is not to suggest that agriculture has not grown or that future
investments in agriculture are not profitable.  Exactly the opposite is true. Further, the
association of rapid growth in agriculture along with growth in other sectors has been a
common characteristic of growth in developing countries. Such growth is usually
associated with the rapid development of new crops and new technologies. In Indonesia,
the palm oil industry has been one such source of growth in a dynamic agricultural sector.
In twenty years, production has grown from less than 400,000 tons of crude palm oil
(CPO) to over 4 million tons.  In addition, with production costs among the lowest in the
world, investment levels are expected to remain high.
As noted in Indonesia: Agricultural Transfornation Challenges and
Opportunities (1992), the tree crops sector occupies a strategic niche in Indonesian
agriculture and development, providing a valuable source of foreign exchange earnings
and generating incomes for millions of smallholder families. Since tree crop production is
concentrated off-Java where poor soils limit food production, growth in the tree crop
sector has also contributed greatly to poverty alleviation off-Java.
3During the last twenty years, the role of the industry as both a vehicle of
development in off-Java and as a supplier of inexpensive cooking oils throughout
Indonesia has been explicitly directed through government ownership of estates and
varying degrees of market interventions. Increasingly, the production capacity has
become more concentrated in private estates and smallholders and govemment
interventions have been reduced. In fact, the history of the palm oil industry in Indonesia
is one of evolution from government-sponsorship  and marketing interventions to private-
sector initiative responsive to international prices signals.
The evolution of the market from public to private sector, while substantial, is
incomplete. Interventions which still remain in the subsector are designed primarily to
limit the negative effects of rising international prices on domestic consumers.  The
primary policy instrument is a variable export levy which targets profits and appears to
have successfully lowered consumer prices. Still, with growing incomes and the
diversification of diets, the effects of cooking oil prices on family welfare has become
increasingly small. At the same time, the costs of the policies to off-Java income and to
potential foreign direct investment remain real and consequential.
The remainder of this report is composed as follows. Following this overview,
Section II describes the structure of palm oil production in Indonesia, including investment
policies, production costs, and concentration in the refining sector. Section III discuses
the government's past and current market interventions. Section IV briefly discusses three
important long-term development issues related to the subsector -- 1) land titlement; 2)
infrastructure; and 3) non-commercial risks as a barrier to private investment. Section V
concludes.
11  The Structure of Production
Production History and Investment Policies
Although considered a new crop in Indonesia palm oil was cultivated and used for
soap production in Central Java by the mid-nineteenth century and oil palm plantations
4producing edible oil appeared in Sumatra by 1911. In 1938 about 90,000 hectares were
planted in oil palm, but during World War II and the following years of early
independence, little growth occurred.  In 1968, all nationalized former-Dutch estates were
reorganized into 28 independent management units: Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan
(PTPs) and Perusahann Negasa Perkebunan (PNPs) and all other nationalized estates were
returned to their previous owners.
Since that time, investment policies have been characterized by three distinct
periods.  From 1968 to 1988 growth in the subsector came through direct government
investments via the PTPs.  From 1988 to 1994, most expansion occurred via a joint
government-private sector development scheme known as Pir-trans. More recently, the
government has initiated a program of government supported private sector and
cooperative investment known as Prime Co-operative Credit for Members (KKPA).
Following the reorganization of the PTPs, expansion and rehabilitation plans were
launched and new plantings begun. Oil palm was considered more profitable than
alternative estate crops, and area devoted to oil palm expanded rapidly. Area planted in
oil palm on government estates grew from 84,000 hectares in 1969 to 176,000 hectares in
1979 to 343,000 hectares in 1987. In the late 1970s, palm oil became a vehicle for rural
development as the government sponsored smallholder development in oil palm.  Lands
were cleared and planted near existing PTPs where smallholder on 2-4 hectares cared for
and harvest the trees, delivering the fresh fruit bunches to the PTP plants for crushing.
'Ion-existent in 1978, smallholder production grew to almost 184,000 tons by the end of
Replita V in 1989. (See Table  1 for statistics on CPO production in Indonesia.)
During the next five years, greater emphasis was placed on the private sector under
the Pir-trans program. Under Pir-trans, the government assumed responsibility for
infrastructure development and facilitated the acquisition of property rights. Land-
clearing was handled by contractors, frequently in exchange for logging rights.  Private
investors were granted access to credit at concessionary rates to be used for estate
development, new crop planting and crushing facilities. Around the estate nucleus, the
government sponsored smallholder development. The standard plan called for a 20
5percent/80 percent mix between estate area and smallholder area. The government
provided financing for smallholder plantings, initial living expenses and housing; the
nucleus estate was responsible for extension services, for collecting and for processing the
fruit bunches.
The Pir-trans program resulted in a significant shift in production from public to
private estates and smallholder production. Further, the full effects of the program will
not be felt until the turn of the century. Some projects approved under Pir-trans have yet
to be completed, and there is a lag of about 8-10 years between initial plantings and full
production for oil palm trees. Still, as can be seen in Figure 1, the public estates are still
the largest source of palm oil in Indonesia. In fact, until 1992, most palm oil in Indonesia
came from public estates
During the up-coming five years, some of the responsibilities the government
assumed under Pir-trans will be handed over to newly formed cooperative organizations
under the KKPA. The system is still relatively new and may evolve once the program is
fully operational. Many in the palm oil industry are only vaguely aware of the program
and few have concrete plans.  An exception is P.T. Smart, which has one 6,000 hectare
project under way in Lampung and two more in preparation for Riau and Kalimantan
Selatan.  Under current arrangements, a developer must establish a separate company in
partnership with a cooperative of smallholders. The developer is responsible for supplying
the development capital and the cooperative provides the land as its contribution to the
company. The newly established company is eligible to draw on a loan from an "executing
bank" at a rate of 11 percent during construction and establishment of the trees and 14
percent after the trees have matured. The 14 percent rate includes a 3 percent fee which is
paid to the cooperative partner to cover administrative costs.  In turn, the "executing
bank" is eligible to borrow from the Bank of Indonesia at a concessionary rate of 4
percent.  Since the spread is large between the BOI rate and the borrowing rate,
developers have an incentive to establish their own executing bank.  The development site
itself follows the nucleus estate approach common under Pir-trans. Smallholder plots can
range from 1 to 5 hectares, although land for alternative crops need not be located at each
6housing site as under Pir-trans. To date, the share of total land devoted to smallholders
versus the nucleus estate remains a minimum 80 percent.
Cost  of Crude  Palm  Oil Production
Indonesia is the lowest cost significant producer of palm oil in the world.
Comparing production costs across different types of vegetable oil is difficult, since many
oils such as soybean oil or rapeseed oil are jointly produced with meals used as animal
feed.  In addition, the fruit of the oil palm contains both a fleshy mesocarp from which
palm oil is recovered, and a seed or kernel from which an oil and meal are also recovered.
Estimating the cost of production for oil palm requires making assumptions about the
value of the kernel by-product as well. (See Figure 2.)  Still, only soybean oil from
Argentina and Brazil is produced at a lower cost than palm oil in Indonesia and only when
soybean meal prices are at average levels or above. Comparative studies, based on
engineering techniques, place the cost of production of palm oil for new projects in
Indonesia at $200/ton. However, a recent paper based on field costs nine oil palm estates
owned by Socfindo (International Planters Conference, October 24-26, 1994) suggests
that the costs may be much lower. Table 2 provides the average costs for establishing new
palm plants and maintaining the immature plants. Table 3 provides cost of production
data for mature plantations, including depreciation and overhead. For Socfindo, the cost
of production for crude palm oil, ex-factory, was a remarkable $127/ton in 1993.
International palm oil prices (in constant 1990 prices) averaged $290/ton in 1990, the
historic low, and averaged well over $600/ton in 1995 -- providing a substantial level of
profitability.
Figure 3 provides the distribution of costs for a mature palm oil plantation.
Depreciation on the fixed initial investments constitutes the largest component of cost-
roughly 26 percent of total costs.  Variable costs, which determine the shutdown point for
palm-oil producing estates averaged less than $100/ton for the Socfindo estates.  Annex 1
provides a more complete description of production costs.
7Market  Concentration  in the  Refining  Industry
Through direct ownership and affiliation, five large refiners organized into two
alliances influence more than 60 percent of the refining capacity in Indonesia and control
the most popular name-brand cooking oils.  While alternatives exist for consumers,
including coconut-based cooking oil, this concentration still raises the issue of
oligopolistic pricing. Table 4 provides the share of refining capacity for the Big Five
Refiners. Together they represent over 61 percent of the industry and market the leading
brand-names in cooking oil. A theoretical measure of market power can be derived by
taking the market share of the Big Five and dividing it by the sum of the supply elasticity
of competitors weighted by the remaining market share minus the (negative) elasticity of
demand'.  The measure yields the percentage by which the monopolist should raise prices
above marginal costs. (Akiyama and Larson, 1994) Using an elasticity of demand of 1.6
(Larson, 1990) and supply elasticities ranging from 1 to 2 yields a market power measure
ranging from 26 percent to 31 percent.  (Table 5.) In other words, if the Big Five Refiners
were to collude, they may well be able to increase domestic prices roughly 26-31 percent
above competitive levels.
However, the statistical evidence of monopolistic pricing is inconclusive.
Calculations of ex-factory cooking oil prices when compared to import parity prices reveal
that from the reforms of 1991 to the introduction of the export tax in September 1994, ex
factory prices averaged about 14 percent above import parity prices.  (Figure 4)  Still, the
lack of import restrictions are also likely to mitigate the domestic market power of the Big
Five.  For example, as the elasticity of supply for competing imports increases, the market
power of the Big Five goes to zero, regardless of their large market share.  Further,
monopolistic pricing is frequently characterized by stable-but-high prices. However the
time series on prices indicates no difference between the coefficient of variation of
international prices of olein from Malaysia and domestic wholesale prices for CPO-based
cooking oil. (See Figure 5.)
The measure  of market  power  is given by  share  where  share is the share of the Big Five
e  (I-  share)- Ed
refiners, es,  and Ed are the price  elasticities  of supply  for competitors  and  demand  respectively.
8111  Market  Interventions
Background
Prior to the export deregulation  in June 1991,  the palm oil subsector  was subject
to a number  of policy  interventions  including  administered  prices  and a single  marketing
chain. The policy  objectives  were at times  contradictory  goals  of maintaining  inexpensive
supplies  of cooking  oil at stable  prices and  promoting  exports. Recent interventions  by
the Bulog  and continued  allocations  of PTP-origin  palm oil are  best understood  in the
context  of historic  interventions.  An understanding  of past policy  interventions  also  helps
explain  why  recent  marketing  interventions  raise  fears of a re-regulation  of the industry.
Cooking  oil is one of the 'Nine  Essential  Commodities'  for Indonesian  consumers.
Recent  and past interventions  were intended  to ensure  adequate  supplies  of cooking  oil for
consumers  at affordable  prices. Tomich  and Mawardi  (1995)  trace regulations  intended  to
impose  a crude  palm oil (CPO)  price  ceiling  back to 1973,  but note  that it was not  until
1978  that effective  regulations  were  instituted  to establish  a domestic  price  ceiling  for
CPO and to allocate  supplies  of CPO to Indonesian  firms  through  quantitative  export
restrictions.  At the time, more  than  two-thirds  of CPO supplies  came from the
government-owned  PTPs. Allocations  of CPO supplies  from public  and private  estates
were administratively  directed  to specific  firms  for domestic  processing  or for export.
Because of the complex nature of the allocation process, four separate palm oil
prices were administered by the late 1980s. All CPO produced by state-owned
plantations,  including  oil originating  with smallholders  located  around  the nucleus  estate,
had to be marketed  through  the Joint Marketing  Board (KPB-Medan).  Foreign-owned
plantations  (PMA  firms)  were required  to allocate  a portion  of their  production  to
domestic  market  operations  and provide  a portion  of their production  to KPB-Medan.
Domestically  owned  plantations  (PMDN  firms)  were not subject  to domestic  allocations
and were not required  to market  CPO through  KPB-Medan. As a result,  there was one
price for CPO exported  directly  by PMA and PMDN  plantations;  a second  price  for CPO
9exported through KPB-Medan; a third price allocated to domestic processors; and a
fourth price was set for imported CPO.
Tomich and Mawardi analyze the effects of the policy interventions from 1978 to
1987 and concluded that the intervention policies harmed both consumers and producers.
From 1978 to 1987, the combination of export taxes, domestic price ceilings and
allocation requirements generated an -9 percent average nominal rate of protection for the
palm oil estates.  Consumer price data limited the analysis to a period in 1981 to 1987, but
during that period Indonesian consumers paid roughly 6-12 percent above import parity
for domestic cooking oil.  Tomich and Mawardi estimated the total cost to producers and
consumers for  1982-87 at Rp 800 billion for consumers and Rp 387 billion for
producers.
Current Policy Issues
Since the removal of trade restrictions on palm oil on June 3 1991, domestic prices
have been determined by events in the larger global market for fats and oils.  Although
Indonesia is a large producer of palm oil and coconut oil, Indonesia produces only 5-6
percent of the annual global market of 90 million tons of fats and oils.  International
vegetable oil prices are notoriously volatile and movements in international prices are
quickly reflected in domestic prices. (See Figure 6.) Further, the consumption pattern of
domestic vegetable-oil based cooking oils has a significant seasonal component during
December through March.  (See Figure 7.)  Cooking oil is viewed as an essential
commodity because of its historically significant  role in the Indonesian diet. Further
because of the dominant position of palm oil among cooking oils (Table 6), and because of
its position as the most affordable of cooking oils, the recent rally in international prices
raised concerns over domestic prices levels. Anticipation of historically high international
prices during the holiday season led to additional calls for market interventions.
Growth in incomes has resulted in a diversified household budget with less
importance given to cooking oil-- even among the poor.  Cooking oil comprises 1.4
percent of the CPI and 4 percent of the household budget of the poorest 20 percent of the
I0rural population.  As a result, the 21 percent increase in the prices of cooking oil in 1994
only contributed 0.3 points to the inflation rate.  Further, the costs to the poorest
consumers of the increase in palm oil was equivalent to a 0.4 percent decrease in their
household  income. It is unlikely,  with average  incomes  growing  at more  than 6 percent,
that the price increase  generally  created  a burden  for consumers.
Still,  the issue  retains  political  and social  significance  due  in part to the historic
importance  of cooking  oil to the diet and the history  of government  intervention  in the
market.  The Government of Indonesia intervenes in the marketfor palm oil in using
three instruments: 1) a variable-rate export tax introduced in September 1994; 2) Bulog
operations which included a CPO buffer-stock and govemment-subsidized imports of
olein; 3) Continued directed sales of about 80 percent of production from state-owned
estates (PTPs) to domestic markets at allocation prices which are at times below market
prices. For reasons  explained  below,  only the variable  export  tax has had a demonstrable
effect  on domestic  prices. Further,  because  of the current  structure  of the market,  buffer
stock operations,  subsidized  imports,  and domestic  allocations  at below-market  prices
represent  transfers  that effect  profits,  but not final market  prices. In short, these
instruments  can only  have  limited  and transitory  influence  since  domestic  prices are
determined  by international  prices  and trade  flows.
A.  Export Tax
The variable-export  tax is linked  to FOB prices for CPO and  three CPO products:
refined,  deodorized,  and  bleached palm oil (RBD  PO), crude olein,  and RBD olein. The
price levels are announced  by the Ministry  of Trade monthly,  and are based  on average
spot  prices. The level of the tax calculated  by applying  a schedule  of average  tax rates  to
the difference  between  the price announced  by the Ministry  of Trade and a floor price set
in the tax code. Taxes are then assessed  on a per-ton  basis according  to product  type
regardless  of the price actually  contracted.  (This  feature  reduces  the incentives  to under-
invoice.)  Stearin  which  is lower-valued  and represents  about  20.5  percent of CPO by
weight  is excluded  from  export taxes  as are other minor  by-products.  Table 7 provides
11the tax schedule and Table 8 provides a calculation of the actually taxes imposed since
September 1994. Annex 2 provides an example of the monthly decree which fixes the
export tax for crude CPO and the CPO products.
The tax is modeled on a similar policy in Malaysia and is designed to tax windfall
profits during boom periods.  Cost of production for CPO in Indonesia is generally
estimated at less-than $200/ton. When international prices remain below $435/ton, no tax
is levied on exports.  As international prices rise from $435 to $800/ton, average tax levels
rise from zero to 18 percent.  As a result, the tax does not generate a large burden on the
profitability of producing crude palm oil. 2
The construction of the tax code does create two anomalies, both of which can be
remedied. First, because of the way the tables are written, the tax rate does not smoothly
increase. In fact, for some values, the tax actually declines slightly as international prices
rise. This kinked tax schedule is illustrated in Figure 8. More importantly, the marginal
tax rates between CPO and the various CPO-based products are determined
independently. As a result, the processing margins can and do differ from international
levels. Because of the independence of the tax rates on products from the underlying tax
rate on crude palm oil, processors cannot know their processing margins until the tax is
announced. In short, the current structure of the tax distorts the market signals for
processing and generally lowers the incentives to process oil domestically.  Also, the
incentives or disincentives to process fluctuate widely. In fact, because of the tax, margins
can and have been negative. This point is illustrated in Figure 9 which maps the spread
between the price of  olein and the price of crude. The true processing margin is
determined simultaneously between the price of the crude and the price all of the
processed products (olein, stearin, etc.).  However, as can be seen by the graph, the tax
has generally lowered the spread between the price of crude and olein discouraging local
processing in favor of off-shore processing.
2 To see how  the tax works  consider  the August  31, 1994  decree  given in Annex 2. Using average  prices
in August,  the decree  states that  the September  tax will be based  on an FOB  price for CPO of $548/ton.
The tax is then calculated  as 48 percent  of the difference  between  the FOB price and the floor price,  or .48
x ($548-$435)  = $54.24/ton.
12Further, the inability of processors and traders to predict the effect of the tax on
margins impedes many common methods of managing price risk. Forward contracts up to
45 days have evolved in Indonesia in recent years.  Normally, these contracts, based on a
Rotterdam price, allow processors to sell their CPO-based products forward as they
purchase their crude CPO, locking in profits.  However, since the tax is fixed on the last
day of the month for the up-coming month, the processor cannot calculate his margin in
advance and can only use intra-month risk management techniques.
Below, several reasons are given for reconsidering the export tax. However if the
export tax remains in place, the two anomalies created by the tax code can be remedied
by: 1) re-writing the schedule in terms of rates based on the FOB price rather than rates
on the difference between the FOB price and the floor price; 2)  basing the export tax for
all products on the CPO content of the item. For example, in November, the FOB price
of palm oil was $578/ton and the export tax was set at around $63/ton. By setting the
export tax for RBD olein at $46/ton (73 percent of the CPO tax since one ton of CPO
produces on average .73 tons of olein), the stearin tax at $15.44 (24.5 percent) and the tax
on the remaining products at $1.56/ton (2.5 percent), the tax will neither discourage nor
encourage the domestic processing.
The export tax generally has been effective in lowering domestic ex-factory,
wholesale, and retail prices for cooking oil. Figure 10 plots the ex-factory and retail
prices of cooking oil derived from palm oil with the import parity price of RBD olein.
(Palm-oil based cooking oil is a more refined version of RBD olein.) The ex-factory
cooking oil price mirrored the import parity price of olein from the liberalization of the
palm oil market in June 1991 until the imposition of the export tax in September, 1994.
Since then, the local ex-factory price has shifted downward and has averaged less than the
olein import parity price. The relationship between the cooking oil and the olein price has
been unstable with both positive and negative margins. This is in part due to the backward
looking nature of the export tax calculation. Since the export tax for any given month is
based on the observed international price for the previous month, the changes in the tax
rate will lag changes in the spot price.  Further, since the tax rate is also progressive, the
13relationship is even further complicated. Still, on average, the tax has resulted in the
expected outcome, as can be seen in Table 9. The average tax rate went from zero to just
under 16 percent for RBD olein, while the ratio of the import parity price of olein and the
ex-factory price of palm oil based cooking oil dropped 16 percent, from a 1.14 to 0.98.
In other words, the spread above import parity dropped from a positive 14 percent to a
negative 2 percent.  Also, the average mark-up between the domestic wholesale and retail
price of cooking oil has been unaffected by the import tax, averaging 19 percent prior to
the export tax and 20 percent following the imposition of the tax.
The incidence of the taxfalls  primarily on producers, most of which are off-Java,
and about 22 percent of which are smallholders. With the margins along the processing
chain unaffected by the export tax, the incidence falls on producers.  The tax therefore
transfers income from palm oil growers-smallholder,  private, and public estates and
transfers that income to consumers, mostly urban consumers, mostly on Java.
Unfortunately, the domestic price for most crude palm oil is not directly observed.
Prices on domestic crude oil marketed by the Joint Marketing Office (JMO), the
marketing arm of the state plantations, are available. As shown later, the JMO has
sometimes been directed to supply local processors at less than export equivalent prices.
However, the ratio of the JMO crude price to the ex-factory palm-oil based cooking oil
price has remained steady at about 71 percent following the introduction of the export tax.
(See Table 9.) Spreads did increase somewhat as international prices boomed (Figure 11);
however, large spreads occurred before and after the tax and may more linked to JMO
directives than a more general market based phenomena.
A small spreadsheet model, available from the author, was constructed to measure
the welfare effects of the export tax. The results are summarized in Tables 10 and 11.
The model is described in Annex 3. The analysis was based on international and domestic
prices for January and November 1995. The results are sensitive to the relative
international prices and the processing margins. January was near the high end of the
boom and November near the low end.  Together the two simulations bracket the likely
welfare effects of the tax.  Generally,  the government and consumers benefit from the tax
14at the expense of the plantation sector.  Further, export revenues are significantly
depressed.
The tax lowers domestic prices which increases domestic consumption as
consumers choose more palm oil over coconut oil and other consumables than they would
at international prices. Under the base-line scenarios, a demand elasticity of -1.6, taken
from an econometric model (Larson, 1990) was used, although an alternative elasticity of
-0.9 was also used to test the sensitivity of the results.  When intemational prices were
high as in January, the tax resulted in an almost 24 percent increase in domestic demand,
(when compared to a no-tax high-domestic price alternative scenario) diverting supplies
otherwise exported.  On an annualized basis, export revenues were lowered by $US 384
million and plantation revenue fell by nearly $US 400 million ($US 120 million from
smallholders). Local refiners gain volume, but lose revenue under this scenario.
Consumers gain $US 164 million in consumer surplus and the government gains about
$US 182 million in government revenue.
Using a less elastic demand schedule and lower price level gives more conservative
measure of the welfare effects.  Still, using these conservative assumptions, the export tax
results in an annual $US 277 million loss  for plantations, including a $US 83 million
loss to smallholders.  The loss to producers is equivalent to about 1% of agricultural
GDP.  Consumers would gain $US 123 million in consumer surplus or about 66 cents per
consumer.  The government would pick up $US 126 million in tax revenue. Refiners
would take a lower margin, but would gain revenues due to an increase in volume.  Total
net welfare falls by $US 10 million.  In addition, export revenues drop by '$158 million.
B.  Directed  Domestic  Sales
While private plantations are free to dispose of their products according to the
dictates of the market, palm oil from the PTPs must be marketed through the Joint
Marketing Office. In addition, roughly 80 percent of the palm oil must be sold
domestically. The public estate sector does not own processing facilities, so the oil is sold
as crude. Generally, the JMO is free to pursue the highest possible domestic price.
15However, the private sector is not similarly restricted and private sector activity keeps the
domestic market in competitive equilibrium with international prices. Consequently, under
normal circumstances, the JMO will receive a competitive price, despite the restriction
that it must sell domestically. Conversely, eliminating both the restriction that all PTPs
must market through the JMO and lifting the restriction that a certain portion of sales must
be for the domestic market, would also have little to no effect on domestic prices.
However, occasionally, as in thefirst quarter of 1995, the JMO is directed to offer crude
to the domestic refiners at below-market prices.  The episode was not long-lasting, as can
be seen in Figure 12. Figure 12 graphs the difference between the price for domestic sales
and the export price as well as the export tax for crude palm oil. Normally, the two
vertical bars should be about equal. In December 1994, the JMO was able to take
advantage of local shortages to do better than expected. However in January and
February 1995, the office was directed to sell at lower prices and did so.
Since domestic market prices are determined by international prices (net of export
taxes), selling into the domestic market at reduced prices can have no lasting effect on
domestic prices-the  transfer is intra-marginal. This is shown graphically in Figure 13. If
the JMO is required to sell at Pd rather than Pw an amount represented by S  1, those
purchasing the crude are still free to export the crude themselves, or use the crude to
displace oil that they would otherwise purchase. Since the oil is not consumed in crude
form, the policy results in a direct transfer from the producers of the oil, the government-
owned PTPs and their smallholder partners, to whoever purchases the crude-primarily
large agribusiness. Despite the good intentions of the directive, consumers are not made
better off. The amount of the transfer is represented by the shaded rectangle defined by
the Pw, Pd and the line at S 1.
Since monthly sales data is not available, it is not possible to exactly calculate the
cost of the policy to the public estate sector. However, average prices and sales can be
used to give some indication.  From September 1994 to August 1995, the spread between
the export price and domestic sales price for JMO sales averaged about $17.27/ton more
16than the export tax. The $17.27 average includes several months when the JMO was able
to do better in its domestic sales than the export price net of the export tax
The domestic sales price may be below the border equivalent due to transport;
however even with a generous assumption of $2.50/ton for transport, the difference
remains $14.77. Since annual estate production is about 1.8 million tons, this difference
amounts to about $26.6 rnillion in lost revenue . It is unclear how much of this difference
was due to directed sales.  However the estimate is probably a conservative measure of
the cost to estates of marketing through the IMO.  Since the PTPs are publicly owned, the
primary effect of the directed marketing through the JMO is a transfer of $26.6 million
from the public estates to the domestic purchasers of PTP crude.  However roughly 18
percent of the crude is produced by smallholders who suffer a loss of about $4.8 million.
C.  Bulog operations.
In July, 1995 the National Logistics Agency (Bulog) announced the start of a
buffer stock operation designed to bring the price of domestic cooking oil down from
about Rp 1,600 to Rp 1,410 by September 1995. The operations were expected to cut
large-scale vendors out of the distribution line, bringing products directly from producers
to small-scale vendors and retailers. The buffer stock, made up of directed sales (half
from the PTPs and half from large private plantations), was expected to build up to 75,000
tons of CPO.  Cooking oil demand in Indonesia contains a significant seasonal component,
with consumption running 10 to 20 percent higher during December, January and
February during the New Year and Idutl  Fitri holidays and the buffer stock was intended
to prevent price run-ups during the seasonal increase in demand.
In July, nine private CPO producers agreed to provide allocations of CPO totally
37,500 tons to the Bulog.  (The allocations are given in Table 12.) With domestic prices
running around Rp. 1,387, the private producers agreed to a sales price of around Rp
1,235. PTPs were directed to provide a similar amount. S55.5 million (Rp 125 billion)
was set aside as an interest-free load from Bank Indonesia to finance the purchases.
During the subsequent months however, the firms made partial deliveries to the Bulog as
17international prices remained high. By September, the Bulog had accumulated around
16,000 tons-- 10,000 tons from the PTPs and 6,000 from the private estates.  Prices
dipped briefly in the early fall and some additional stocks were accumulated. However,
with prices falling below Rp 1,235 and producers anxious to sell to the Bulog at the
agreed-upon price, the Bulog suspending the buffer-stock operation with stocks at 20,000
tons at the beginning of November.
With the suspension of the CPO stocking, the Bulog switched to stock-piling olein,
purchasing about 86,000 tons of crude olein from Malaysia. Since the Bulog has access to
interest-free loans, it can import the olein at lower-than-market cost.  Further, if needed,
the olein can be sold into the domestic market at below-market prices.
In addressing temporary shortages, the import of olein has advantages over
stockpiling CPO, since the olein can be converted into cooking oil more quickly.
However, there are limitations to the influence the olein imports are likely to have on the
domestic market. First, since domestic prices are still determined by international prices
less export taxes, the Bulog cannot influence the domestic price of olein over an extended
period.  Olein purchased cheaply can simply be exported for profit, or substituted for
domestic supplies which are then exported.  Second, some of the temporary shortages in
olein supplies may be an unintended consequence of the current tax schedule which has
discriminated against the local production of olein.  As explained above, this comes from
the fact that the tax for the palm oil products are not based on the CPO content of the
products, thereby changing the relationship between the domestic CPO price and the
domestic olein price-to  the detriment of local processing. The spread between CPO and
crude and RBD olein are given in Table 13, along with the implied tax rate on the spread.
The implied tax is calculated as the difference between the spread in international markets
and the domestic spread. At times, the implicit tax on processing has exceeded 100%
resulting in negative margins.
18IV Long-term  Development  Issues.
Land  procurement  and titles
Oil palm trees produce fruit on a continuous basis, with seasonal variations. Once
ripe, the fresh fruit bunches must be processed quickly to prevent a build-up of acid in the
oil. Fruit which has not been crushed within 48 hours has limited value. Palm oil
plantations are usually built around a processing facility, which, in turn, requires the
leasing or purchase of large contiguous tracts of land. Smallholder production may appear
once an estate has been established.  In fact, smallholder development was a requirement
to qualify for many of the government investment programs.  However, the process of
identifying  and acquiring  land remains  a major impediment  to establishing  new estates.
This  process is made more difficult  from the  fact that very  little of the land is titled.
Once a plantation company has identified a potentially suitable site, the company
begins a two-pronged approval process. The company first files an application with the
Director General of Estates for a location permit.  The location permit also requires the
approval of the local governor, and an application is also sent to the local government at
the same time. The estate company conducts a location study which it provides to both
the local and central government.  Once both applications are approved, the central and
local forestry agencies conduct a review of the project's impact.  Once this review process
is complete, the complicated process of identifying settlers and providing compensation to
those settlers is begun.  Since the land is infrequently titled, these negotiations can be
complicated and intractable. Following the negotiations, the land is typically leased for 30
years with an option to renew, rather than purchased outright.
The lack of clear title certainly builds a barrier to investment in tree crops.
However, the implication for smallholders is much broader. Lack of title inhibits transfers
of ownership in general, and smallholders who may wish to migrate to better opportunities
may have to abandon valued properties. Settlers, who have gained partial rights, but not
title,  to land in nucleus  estates  may be similarly  tied to those  development  projects.
19Direct Investment and a Potential Role for the World Bank
The Government of Indonesia has always either invested directly or provide
incentives for new palm oil plantations in Indonesia. Given the profitability of palm oil in
Indonesia and the comparative advantage of the country in providing vegetable oil to the
rapidly growing world market, the needforfurther  incentives in the  fonr  of subsidized
loans is questionable. The local plantation companies are well capitalized and some have
direct links with large multinational companies. Further, many of the large Malaysian
plantations have recently looked to Indonesia for new investment opportunities, as land
and labor costs have limited the returns to new projects in Malaysia.
Still, establishing new plantations is an expensive and risky venture, requiring large
initial outlays of capital, with long lead times before generating income. Talks with
domestic and foreign plantation companies suggested three impediments to further
investment. First, as already discussed, is the uncertainty associated with the land
procurement process.  Second, for some areas, the transportation infrastructure is
inadequate. Third, many investors, especially foreign investors, are uncertain about the
extent of current and future government interventions in the palm oil market.  Some of this
arises from a misunderstanding of Indonesian policies.  For example, in a paper presented
at the April 1995 Kuala Lumpur Commnodity  Exchange Price Outlook Forum, a delegate
speculated that the Bulog would require private producers to contribute 25-30 percent of
their output to the logistical agency (Hwa, 1995).
Currently, the incentives provided by inexpensive credit have been effective in
providing new capital flows to the palm oil sector. At the same time, the private capital
market is mature enough to take on an increased role mitigating the need for government
subsidies.  The Bank can assist by helping to address directly the impediments to private
sector investment through 1) land titlement programs; 2) investments in infrastructure;
and 3) addressing issues of policy risk.
The Bank has past experience in project lending for land titlement and
infrastructure in Indonesia. Issues of policy risk have been addressed primarily through
dialogue with the government on policy issues. In other countries in other sectors, the
20Bank has entered into partnership with governments to provide explicit guarantees against
non-commercial risk to private sector investors. The GOI may well want to discuss with
the Bank how such schemes could be used as an alternative to subsidized lending.  Under
interest-subsidy schemes, the GOI takes on the risk that private borrowers will be unable
to repay for any reason.  Under a guarantee, neither the Bank nor the Government of
Indonesia would shoulder any commercial risk.  Instead, the guarantees would target
directly uncertainties over policies.
Conclusions
During the last twenty years, the history of the palm oil industry in Indonesia is one
of evolution from government sponsorship and market interventions to private sector
initiative in response to international  price signals. The evolution of the market from public
to private sector, while substantial, is incomplete. Investments in new oil palm estates
receive preferential financing terms. Further, marketing interventions aimed at reducing
inflation and assisting consumers remain but with unintended consequences.
Of the intervention tools, the export tax appears effective in the domestic price of
crude palm oil and ultimately the cost of refined cooking oil from palm oil. However,
because of substantial gains in income, cooking oil is of limited importance in the
household budget of even the poorest consumer in Indonesia. As a result although the
issue itself is important politically and socially, the gains to consumers from the tax are not
significant economnically,  averaging less than a dollar per consumer per year.
The export tax transfers up to $99 million from producers to consumers and the
government by depressing exports. Since the tax is only brought to bear when profits are
unusually high, the export tax does not create an unmanageable burden on the sector.
However most production occurs off-Java and 22 percent of the growers are smallholders.
As a result, the tax runs counter to the government's development priorities.  Since the
advantages to consumers is limited, the government should drop the tax.
21The structure of the tax does create a real burden on processors and, if the tax is
not dropped, it should be changed to allowv  international price signals for processing
services to reach domestic processors.  Because the tax rates on palm oil products are
determined independently of the underlying price of crude, the marketing margins for
processors cannot be known in advance, precluding effective risk management.
Additionally, the structure of the tax discourages local processing.  If the tax is not
repealed, the tax rate for processed palm oil products should be based on the crude oil
content of those products.
The other forms of interventions -- Bulog interventions and restrictions on JMO
sales-- are ineffective in lowering domestic prices and create uncertainty for investors.
These interventions should be eliminated.
The processing market is quite concentrated with two alliances among five large
processing groups controlling more than 60 percent of the market.  Still, while the
potential for oligopolistic pricing exists, the statistical evidence is equivocal.
The interest subsidies provided to private investors are an indirect instrument for
overcoming the risks and uncertainties associated with establishing estates with a
smallholder component. The evolution of the palm oil sub-sector from heavily public to
primarily private may be accomplished by targeting the obstacles to private investment
directly. The Bank can play a role in that process by designing projects that address
l)land titlement, 2) rural infrastructure; and 3) policy risk.
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23Annex 1: Average  oil palm fresh  fruit  bunch  production  costs for nine
Socfindo  estates
Cost Categpry  1991-  1992  1993
Rp/ton  $US/ton  Rp/ton  $US/ton  Rp/ton  $US/ton
UPKEEP  ......
Imperata  control  172.2  0.09  190.7  0.09  160.9  0.08
Weeding  1,840.0  0.92  1,908.1  0.93  2,103.7  1.00
Manuring  5,372.9  2.70  5,865.0  2.84  5,090.6  2.41
Pruning  929.7  0.47  992.5  0.48  938.5  0.44
Other upkeep  3,009.8  1.51  3,069.3  1.49  3,227.1  1.53
TOTAL  UPKEEP  11,324.6  5.69  12,025.6  5.83  11,520.8  5.46
HARVESTING
Harvesting  5,050.7  2.54  5,351.5  2.60  5,601.1  2.65
Transport  to mill  2,997.8  1.50  3,039.2  1.47  3,134.3  1.49
TOTAL  HARVESTING  8,048.5  4.04  8,390.7  4.07  8,735.4  4.14
PROCESSING
Processing  4,932.2  2.48  5,018.5  2.43  5,172.6  2.45
Maintenance  5,206.3  2.61  4,210.4  2.04  3,970.3  1.88
TOTAL  PROCESSING  10,138.5  5.09  9,228.9  4.47  9,142.9  4.33
GENERAL  EXPENSES  8,525.8  4.28  9,653.3  4.68  8,869.7  4.20
PACKING  80.5  0.04  62.1  0.03  68.7  0.03
TOTALEX-FACTORY  38,117.9  19.14  39,360.6  19.09  38,337.4  18.17
FOR.  584.4  0.29  506.5  0.25  536.0  0.16
FOB  280.9  0.14  274.9  0.13  329.9  0.16
FIXED COST  HEAD-OFFICE  4,799.3  2.41  5,380.4  2.61  4,872.7  2.31
TOTAL  CASH  COST  43,782.5  21.98  45,522.3  22.08  44,126.0  20.91
DEPRECIATION  11,593.0  5.82  12,451.3  6.04  15,105.4  7.16
TOTAL  BOOK  COST  55,375.4  27.80  57,973.7  28.12  59,231.4  28.07
Source: Socfindo
24Annex 2: Text from Export Decree
THE IMPOSITION OF EXPORT TAX ON CRUDE PALM OIL (CPO), REFINED BLEACHED
DEODORIZED PALM OIL (RBD PO), CRUDE OLEIN AND REFINED BLEACHED DEODORIZED
OLEIN (RBD OLEIN) (Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 439/KMK.01  7/1994 dated August 31,
1994)
THE MINISTER OF FINANCE,
a.  That with a view to controlling the selling price of cooking oil on the domestic market, it is deemed
necessary to impose export tax on CPO, RBD PO, Crude olein and RBD Olein;
b.  That it is necessary to regulate the imposition of export tax on CPO, RBD PO, Crude olein and RBD
Olein in a decree of the Minister of Finance.
In view of:
I . Government Regulation No.  1/1982 on the realization of exports, imports and  the flow of  foreign
exchange (Statute Book of  1982 No. 1, Supplement to Statute Book No. 321 0) as already amended
by Government Regulation No. 24/1985 (Statute Book of  1985 No. 32, Supplement to Statute Book
No. 3291);
2.  Presidential Decree No. 96/M11993;
3.  The Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 738/KMK.00/1991 dated July 29,  1991 on the customs
procedure in the export sector.  The Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 291/KMK.01/1 994;
4.  The Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 534/KMK.013/1992 dated May 27,  1992 on the rates of
and the procedure for payment and depositing of export tax and or export surcharges.
Taking into account:
1.  The letter of the Minister/State Secretary No.B-166/M.Sesneg, 8/1994 dated August 26, 1994;
2.  The letter of the Minister of Trade No. 580/M/V111194  dated August 30, 1994.
DECIDES:
To stipulate:
THE DECREE OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE CONCERNING THE IMPOSITION OF EXPORT
TAX ON CRUDE PALM OIL (CPO), REFINED BLEACHED DEODORIZED PALM OIL (RBD PO),
CRUDE OLEIN AND REFINED BLEACHED DEODORIZED OLEIN (RBD OLEIN).
Article 1.
Hereinafter referred to as:
1.  Floor prices are highest export prices which are not subject to export tax.
2.  Export prices are FOB prices which are announced by the Minister of Finance monthly.
Article 2.
(1)  Crude palm oil (CPO), refined- bleached deodorized palm oil (RBD PO), crude olein and refined
bleached deodorized olein (RBD olein) shall be subject to export tax.
(2)  The export tax as meant in paragraph (1) shall be imposed if the price of cooking oil on the
domestic market is above Rp 1,250/kg.
Article 3.
(1)  The method of calculating  the export tax  to be paid for the respective commodities as meant  in
Article 2 paragraph (1) shall be as follows:
25The volume multiplied by the tariff, times (the price of the relevant export commodity minus the
floor price), times the foreign exchange rate.
(2)  The amounts of export tax shall be calculated on the basis of the rates contained in the attachment
to this decree.
Article 4.
The Minister of Finance shall announce the (FOB) export prices of the respective commodities at
the end of each month on the basis of average prices on the international market over the last 2 (two)
weeks.
Article 5.
The procedure for the payment and depositing of export tax shall be according to the provisions in
as stipulated in the Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 534/KMKO13/1992.
Article 6.
This decree shall come into force as from September 1, 1994 with the provision that the deadline
for exports which are not subject to export tax shall be August 31, 1994 as proved by BIL on Board.









RATES OF EXPORT TAX
NO  PRICES US$/MT  EXPORT TAX RATES/MT
I.  CRUDE PALM OIL (CPO)
1. Floor Price 435  0%
2.  FOB Price:
a.  Above435  up  to 470  60%  x  (HE- HD)
b.  Above470  up  to 505  56%  x  (HE- HD)
c.  Above505  up  to 540  52%  x  (HE- HD)
d.  AboveS40  up  to 575  48%  x  (HE- HD)
e.  Above575  up  to 510  44%  x  (HE- HD)
f.  Above 610  40%  x  (HE-HD)
II.  REFINED BLEACHED DEODORIZED PALM OIL (RBD PO)
1. Floor Price 460  0%
2. FOB Price:
a.  Above460  up  to 500  60%  x  (HE- HD)
b.  Above500  up  to 540  56%  x  (HE- HD)
c.  Above540  up  to 580  52%  x  (HE- HD)
d.  Above580  up  to 620  48%  x  (HE- HD)
e.  Above620  up  to 660  44%  x  (HE- HD)
f.  Above660  40%  x  (HE - HD)
III.  CRUDE OLEIN (CRD OLEIN)
1. Floor Price 465  0%
2. FOB Price
a.  Above 465  up  to 510  75%  x  (HE- HD)
b.  Above 510  up  to 555  70%  x  (HE- HD)
c.  Above 555  up  to 600  65%  x  (HE- HD)
d.  Above 600  up  to 645  60%  x  (HE- HD)
e.  Above 645  up  to 690  55%  x  (HE- HD)
f.  Above 690  50%  x  (HE- HD)
27NO  PRICES US$/MT  EXPORT TAX RATES/MT
VI.  REFINED BLEACHED DEODORIZED OLEIN (RBD OLEIN)
1. Floor Price 500  0%
2. FOB Price
a.  Above500  up to 550  75%  x  (HE- HD)
b.  Above550  up to 600  70%  x  (HE- HD)
c.  Above600  up to 650  65%  x  (HE- HD)
d.  Above650  up to 700  60%  x  (HE- HD)
e.  Above700  up to 750  55%  x  (HE- HD)
f.  Above750  50%  x  (HE- HD)
Note: MT = Metric Ton.
HE = Export Price, HD = Floor Price.
EXPORT PRICES OF CRUDE PALM OIL (CPO), REFINED BLEACHED
DEODORIZED PALM OIL (RBD PO), CRUDE OLEIN AND REFINED
BLEACHED DEODORIZED OLEIN (RBD OLEIN) FOR EXPORT
TAX CALCULATION
(Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 440/KMK.017/1994 dated August 31, 1994)
THE MINISTER OF FINANCE,
Considering:
that for the calculation of export tax on CPO, RBD PO, crude olein and RBD olein
as meant in the Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 439/KMKO17/1994 dated August
31, 1994t it is necessary to stipulate export prices of the said commodities in a decree of
the Minister of Finance.
In view of:




THE DECREE OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE CONCERNING EXPORT PRICES
OF CRUDE PALM OIL(CPO), REFINED BLEACHED DEODORIZED PALM OIL
(RBD PO), CRUDE OLEIN AND REFINED BLEACHED DEODORIZED Of FIN
(RD  OLEIN) FOR EXPORT TAX CALCULATION.
28Article 1.
The (FOB) export prices of CPO, RBD PO, crude olein and RBD olein for the
calculation of export tax as meant in the Decree of the Minister of Finance No.
439/KMKO17/1994 dated August 31, 1994 for the month of September 1994 shall be
fixed as the following:
a. CPO  US$ 548/MT
b. RBD PO  US$ 591/MT
c. Crude Olein  US$ 612/MT
d. RBD Olein  US$ 642/MT
Article 2.
This decree shall come into force as from September 1, 1994.
Stipulated in Jakarta.






29Annex 3: Model description
Because palm oil is a tree crop, supplies of palm oil are determined by the stock of
trees which in turn are determined by past investments. Vintage approaches which
measure cohorts of trees from earlier investments are effective in forecasting supplies.
However, for the purpose of the model used for analyzing the welfare effects of the export
tax, supplies are treated as predetermined and fixed. There are several reasons for this
choice.  The shut-down point for palm oil estates in Indonesia is probably around $US
100/ton or less. The tax begins when prices reach $435/ton. Since production costs are
below $200/ton, the tax only enters into the investment decision when prices are well
above the shut-down point and profit rates are in excess of 100%. The tax may reduce
expected profits and therefore investment and future supplies beginning in 2000 when the
1996 investment begin to yield. However, this effect is likely to be swamped by larger
policy and market issues. The government policy of providing loans at below-market
rates certainly has a greater impact on profitability, given the long maturation process,
than the tax. It is also likely that other barriers like inadequate infrastructure and
difficulties in securing leases to large contiguous tracks of land are binding constraints to
new investments rather than insufficient profits. Indeed, these factors probably help
explain why profit rates are so high.
With supplies fixed and prices determined by intemational prices net of taxes, the
model is driven through the demand function. As domestic prices drop, the demand for
olein raises as consumers substitute palm oil for coconut oil. The price of coconut oil is
unchanged by the export tax, remaining at intemational levels. The demand for olein
equation was derived using the elasticity of demand for palm oil estimated by Larson
(1992) and passing a log-linear demand schedule through point defined by the November
price (and under an alternative scenario the January price) and the consensus prediction of
domestic demand this year -- 2.4 million tons (crude equivalent.) -- then solving for the
intercept.  A 0.78 conversion rate was used to convert crude to olein resulting in the
following demand equation:
30DoIeM  = 41489  (  pdo.estic)  -1.  6
The demand for olein generates a derived demand for crude oil.  Because of
transport costs and more than adequate domestic processing capacity, olein imports are
rare. For the purposes of the modeling exercise, the processing is done locally and the
demand for olein is converted into the derived demand for crude:
D'de  = D°"'  /.078
Exports are then the residual from the domestic supply of 4.4 million tons.
Consumer surplus changes are measured as the integral of the log-linear demand function
evaluated with and without the export tax:
AiCS  =(Dn°larPnorar  - DrP"ao)/(I  +  Li)
Tax revenue is calculated by taking the exports times the export tax; export revenue is
calculated by taking the export price times exports; and producer income is taken as
production times the domestic price. Changes to refining revenues are calculated by taken
the  domestic after-tax margins times the demand for crude with the tax minus the
international margins times the demand for crude without the tax.
31Table  1: Palm oil production  in Indonesia,  1975-1994  (tons).
Year  Public Estate  Private Estate  Smaliholder  Total
1975  271,171  126,082  - 397,253
1976  286,096  144,910  - 431,006
1977  336,891  120,716  - 457,607
1978  336,224  165,060  - 501,284
1979  438,756  201,724  760  641,240
1980  498,858  221,544  770  721,172
1981  533,399  265,616  1,045  800,060
1982  598,653  285,212  2,955  886,820
1983  710,431  269,102  3,454  982,987
1984  814,015  329,144  4,031  1,147,190
1985  861,173  339,241  43,016  1,243,430
1986  912,306  384,919  53,504  1,350,729
1987  988,480  352,413  165,162  1,506,055
1988  1,102,692  454,495  156,148  1,713,335
1989  1,184,226  597,039  183,689  1,964,954
1990  1,247,156  788,506  376,950  2,412,612
1991  1,360,363  883,918  413,319  2,657,600
1992  1,489,745  1,076,900  699,605  3,266,250
1993  1,469,156  1,370,272  582,021  3,421,449
1994 *)  1,785,315  1,410,030  899,138  4,094,483
Source:  Directorate  General  of Estates
32Table  2: Socfindo  establishment  costs  and up keep
for new palm oil plantings
1991  1992  1993
New Plantings
Extension  ($US/ha.)  1,406  1,305  1,361
Replanting  ($US/ha.)  1,114  1,188  1,239
Upkeep  (immature  plants,  $/ha.)  303  335  325
Source: Socfindo
Table  3: Average  cost of production  for palm oil for
Socfindo  estates  in 1993
Rp./ton  FFB  US$/ton  FFB  $USAton CPO
Upkeep for plants  11,520.8  5.46  24.82
Harvesting  8,735.4  4.14  18.82
Processing  9,142.9  4.33  19.70
Transport, packing  934.6  0.44  2.01
General estate expenses  8,869.7  4.20  19.11
Headquarters  4,872.7  2.31  10.50
Depreciation  15,105.4  7.16  32.54
Ex-Factory costs  39,203.4  18.58  84.45
Total cash costs  44,076.1  20.89  94.95
Total including capital  59,181.5  28.05  127.49
Source: Socfindo
33Table  4: Capacity  and capacity  share  for Big Five  palm
oil refiners
Annual Capacity
thousand tons  capacity share
.....................................................................................................  ...................  ..........  .......................................................................  .............
Hasil Karsa Group
PT. Singa Mas Jaya Perdana  325.00  6.3%
PT. Asap Abadi  400.00  7.7%
PT. Hasil Kesatuan  147.88  2.8%
PT. Hasil Abadi Perdana  88.80  1.7%
sub-total  961.68  18.5%
.....................................................................................................  ...................................................
Musim Mas Group
PT. Musim Mas  380.00  7.3%
PT. Siringo-Ringo  90.00  1.7%
PT. Mega Surya Mas  152.00  2.9%
PT. Bina Karya Prima  255.00  4.9%
sub-total  877.00  16.9%
........................................................................................................................................................
Sinar Mas Group
PT.  IvoMasTunggal  212.00  4.1%
PT.  Sinar Meadow  30.00  0.6%
PT. Mulyo Rejo  118.80  2.3%
PT. Smart Corporation  271.00  5.2%
sub-total  631.80  12.2%
Salim Group
PT.  Sawit Malinda  45 00  0.9%
PT. Sayang Heulang  210 00  4.0%
PT. Inti Boga Sejahtera  210 00  4.0%
sub-total  465 00  8.9%
Bukit Kapur Group
PT. Bukit Kapur Rekasa  180 00  3.5%
PT. Sinar Alam Permai  70 00  1.3%
sub-total  250 00  4.8%
........................................................................................................................................................
TOTAL  3,185.48  61.3%
Source: Bulog
34Table  5: Market  power  calculation
Market Share of the Big Five  0.61  0.61
Elasticity of demand  1.60  1.60
Elasticity of supply (others)  1.00  2.00
Market power  31%  26%
Source: World Bank
Table  6: Production  and supply  of cooking  oil from crude  coconut  and  palm
oi.
Year  Production  Import  Export  Supply
Coconut  Palm  Coconut  Palm  Coconut  Palm  Coconut  Palm
1982  432  575  1  0  14  168  419  407
1983  432  376  0  0  0  0  432  376
1984  473  668  0  0  35  0  438  668
1985  517  498  0  0  23  0  494  498
1986  545  514  0  0  5  0  540  514
1987  575  725  0  0  118  0  457  725
1988  567  888  0  0  207  0  360  888
1989  589  948  0  0  197  0  392  948
1990  651  1,055  0  0  194  0  457  1,055
1991  656  993  7  0  198  0  465  993
1992  654  1,654  11  0  351  0  314  1,654
1993  661  1,431  34  0  258  0  437  1,431
Source: Food Balance Sheet for Indonesia, CBS
35Table 7: Tax schedule for palm oil and palm oil products
CRUDE  PALM  OIL (CPO)
Floor Price  435
FOB Price:  Tax rate on
Above  Up to  Export  price nminus  floor price
435  470  60%
470  505  56%
505  540  52%
540  575  48%
575  510  44%
610  40%
REFINED  BLEACHED  DEODORIZED  PALM  OIL (RBD  PO)
Floor  Price  460
FOB Price:  Tax rate  on
Above  Up to  Exportprice nminus  floor  price
460  500  60%
500  540  56%
540  580  52%
580  620  48%
620  660  44%
660  40%
CRUDE  OLEIN  (CRD  OLEIN)
Floor Price  465
FOB Price:  Tax rate on
Above  Up to  Export  price minus  floor price
465  510  75%
510  555  70%
555  600  65%
600  645  60%
645  690  55%
690  50%
CRUDE  OLEIN  (CRD  OLEIN)
Floor Price  500
FOB Price:  Tax rate  on
Above  Up to  Export  price minus  floor price
............  ......................... p  ........  .................................... ...................  ....................................  ...................  ..............  ..........
500  550  75%
550  600  70%
600  650  65%
650  700  60%
700  750  55%
750  50%
Source: Ministry of Finance
36Table 8: Export  tax for crude  palm oil and palm oil products
CPO (US$/ton)  RBD PO  (US$/ton)  Crude Olein (US$/ton)  RBD Olein (US$/ton)
Year/  Month  Floor  Export  Tariff  Export  Floor  Export  Tariff  Export  Floor  Export  Tariff  Export  Floor  Export  Tariff  Export
Price  Price  Rate  Tax  Price  Price  Rate  Tax  Price  Price  Rate  Tax  Price  Price  Rate  Tax
1994 Sep  435  548  9.9%  54.20  460  591  10.6%  62.90  465  612  14.4%  88.20  500  642  14.4%  92.30
Oct  435  583  11.2%  65.10  460  613  12.0%  73.40  465  631  15.8%  99.60  500  661  14.6%  96.60
Nov  435  594  11.8%  70.00  460  624  11.6%  72.20  465  629  15.6%  98.40  500  659  14.5%  95.40
Dec  435  686  14.6%  100.40  460  743  15.2%  113.20  465  717  17.6%  126.00  500  747  18.2%  135.90
1995 Jan  435  662  13.7%  90.80  460  678  12.9%  87.20  465  650  15.7%  101.80  500  680  15.9%  108.00
Feb  435  598  12.0%  71.70  460  637  12.2%  77.90  465  613  14.5%  88.80  500  641  14.3%  91.70
Mar  435  631  12.4%  78.40  460  687  13.2%  90.80  465  673  17.0%  114.40  500  703  15.9%  111.70
Apr  435  653  13.4%  87.20  460  714  14.2%  101.60  465  695  16.5%  115.00  500  725  17.1%  123.80
May  435  584  11.2%  65.60  460  627  11.7%  73.50  465  636  16.1%  102.60  500  666  15.0%  99.60
Jun  435  576  10.8%  62.00  460  613  12.0%  73.40  465  605  13.9%  84.00  500  635  13.8%  87.80
Jul  435  610  12.6%  77.00  460  643  12.5%  80.50  465  631  15.8%  99.60  500  681  15.9%  108.60
Aug  435  620  11.9%  74.00  460  650  12.9%  83.60  465  638  16.3%  103.80  500  668  15.1%  100.80
Sep  435  566  11.1%  62.90  460  598  11.1%  66.20  465  589  13.7%  80.60  500  619  12.5%  77.40
Oct  435  557  10.5%  58.60  460  594  10.8%  64.30  465  578  12.7%  73.50  500  608  11.5%  70.20
Nov  435  578  10.9%  62.90  460  605  11.5%  69.60  465  590  13.8%  81.30  500  620  12.6%  78.00
Average  603  11.9%  72  641  12.4%  79  632  15.4%  97  664  14.8%  99
Source:  Ministry  of Finance  and  World Bank
37Table 9: Effects of the export tax on selected variables
Average
July '91 to Augut'94  .. September '94 to October '95 ....................................................................................................  ..  .......  .....  .....................................................................................  ..............................  ..
Tax Rate  0%  16%
Ratio of
ex-factory  cooking oil
to olein import parity  1.14  0.98
Retail cooking oil
over wholesale price  0.19  0.20
Share of JMO crude
to ex-factory cooking oil price  0.72  0.71
Source: World  Bank Calculations
Table 10: Tax effects on selected prices, November 1995
International prices:  Malaysia, Fob  Domestic price  Tax Rate
$USAton
............................  ......................  ....................
Crude Palm Oil (CPO)  578  515  11%
Refined Palm Oil (RBD PO)  605  535  12%
Crude Olein (CRD Olein)  590  509  14%
Refined Olein (RBD Olein)  620  542  13%
..................... I...........................................................................................................  ............................
Spreads .....................................................................................  ................................................................
**RB.DPO-CPO  27  20  25%
CRD-Olein-CPO  12  -6  153%
RBD Olein-CPO  42  27  36%
Source:  World Bank  Calculations
38Table 11: Welfare  effects of the export tax
Scenarios
January  November  November
Demand  (million tons)  With Tax  baseline  baseline  low elasticity
Domestic demand RBD Olein  1.75  1.33  1.41  1.55
Derived CPO demand  2.40  1.82  1.94  2.13
CPO export  2.00  2.58  2.46  2.27
Change in
Tax revenue (million$)  182  126  126
Consumer surplus (million $)  165  123  129
per capital consumers surplus ($)  0.84  0.63  0.66
Export earnings (million $)  -384  -269  -158
share of agricultural GDP  -1.4%  -1.0%  -0.6%
Refiner revenue (million $)  -99  -74  13
Plantation revenue (million $)  -400  -277  -277
as share of agricultural GDP  -1.5%  -1.0%  -1.0%
smallholder revenue (million $)  -200  -83  -83
as share of agricultural GDP  -0.7%  -0.3%  -0.3%
Net welfare (loss)  -152  -102  -10
share of agricultural GDP  -0.6%  -0.4%  0.0%
Source: World  Bank Calculations
Table  12:  Buffer  stock
allocations of crude palm oi
tons
Sinar Mas Group  9,000
Salim Group  8,500
Sucofindo  5,000
Raja Garuda Mas  3,500
Tolam Tiga Indonesia  3,000
Lonsum Indonesia  2,600
Astra  4,000




39Table 13:  Spreads  between  process  products  and crude  palm oil
RBD CPO - CPO  Crude olein - CPO  RBD olein -CPO
Date  Domestic  World  tax  Domestic  World  tax  Domestic  World  tax
Sep-94  34.30  43.00  20%  30.00  64.00  53%  55.90  94.00  41%
Oct-94  21.70  30.00  28%  13.50  48.00  72%  46.50  78.00  40%
Nov-94  27.80  30.00  7%  6.60  35.00  81%  39.60  65.00  39%
Dec-94  44.20  57.00  22%  5.40  31.00  83%  25.50  61.00  58%
Jan-95  19.60  16.00  -23%  -23.00  -12.00  -92%  0.80  18.00  96%
Feb-95  32.80  39.00  16%  -2.10  15.00  114%  23.00  43.00  47%
Mar-95  43.60  56.00  22%  6.00  42.00  86%  38.70  72.00  46%
Apr-95  46.60  61.00  24%  14.20  42.00  66%  35.40  72.00  51%
May-95  35.10  43.00  18%  15.00  52.00  71%  48.00  82.00  41%
Jun-95  25.60  37.00  31%  7.00  29.00  76%  33.20  59.00  44%
Jul-95  29.50  33.00  11%  -1.60  21.00  108%  39.40  71.00  45%
Aug-95  20.40  30.00  32%  -11.80  18.00  166%  21.20  48.00  56%
Sep-95  28.70  32.00  10%  5.30  23.00  77%  38.50  53.00  27%
Oct-95  31.30  37.00  15%  6.10  21.00  71%  39.40  51.00  23%
Nov-95  20.30  27.00  25%  -6.40  12.00  153%  26.90  42.00  36%
Avg.  30.77  38.07  17%  4.28  29.40  79%  34.13  60.60  46%
Source: World Bank Calculations
40Figure  1: Palm oil production  in Indonesia  by  type of producer
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Figure  2: Selected oil palm products
Oil palm products
Source: World BankFigure 3: Composition of production  costs for mature  palm oil plantation.
Cost of CPO production, 1993
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Figure  4: Cooking  oil and import  parity  prices.
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Figure 6: Prices for Malaysian olein, FOB and domestic palm cooking oil
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Figure 8: Tax schedule for crude palm oil
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Figure 12: Joint Marketing Board prices and the tax
Joint Marketing Board Export-Import
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